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Equal Protection: Can California Offer
More for Undocumented Alien
Children?
Among the more pressing social problems facing the United States
today is the need to develop a consistent policy toward undocumented
aliens.' The problem is especially severe in California where the popula-
tion has swollen from the steady flow of illegal migrants from Mexico
and Central America. 2 In cases dealing with the various legal issues
raised by this immigration, the United States Constitution has been
construed to extend certain basic human rights to undocumented
persons.' This group, however, generally has been excluded from eligi-
bility for most state and federal entitlement programs.4 Although the
denial of public assistance benefits to undocumented aliens has been
upheld repeatedly,5 several recent decisions have employed novel in-
terpretations of the Constitution to require an extension of benefits
to this group of people.6
In Plyler v. Doe7 the United States Supreme Court paved the way
for the establishment of new rights for undocumented children. In
Plyler the Court relied upon the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment' to invalidate a Texas statute that denied primary
education to children not admitted legally to the United States. 9 The
Court applied an intermediate level of scrutiny and determined that
the statutory discrimination against undocumented children deprived
1. Immigration: Closing the Door, NEWSWEEK, July 25, 1984, at 18. For the purposes
of this comment the term "undocumented" will be used to designate all persons who, when
required to provide documentation of citizenship or legal alien status, do not have this documen-
tation on their person. The term "illegal alien" will be reserved for those aliens who are under
formal order of deportation by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. See Dermegerdich
v. Rank, 151 Cal. App. 3d 848, 851, 199 Cal. Rptr. 30, 32 (1984) (statutory construction of
"illegal").
2. See LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, REG. SESS. 1977-78, UNDOCUMENTED
PERSONS: THEm IMPACT ON PUBLIC AssIsTANcE PROGRAMS, PUBLIC HEARINGS OF THE ASSEMBLY
COMITTEE ON HumAN REsouRcEs (Nov. 9, 1977).
3. See infra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. §435.402 (eligibility for Medicaid), 45 C.F.R. §233.50 (1984) (eligibility
for Aid to Families with Dependent Children program).
5. See Comment, Equal Protection for Undocumented Aliens, 5 CmIcANo L. REv. 29,
34-43 (1982).
6. See infra notes 86-99 and 112-45 and accompanying text.
7. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
8. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, §1.
9. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230.
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them of equal protection of the laws." In reaching this conclusion
the Court considered the importance of education and the special status
of these children."
An issue similar to that faced by the Court in Plyler recently was
considered by the California Supreme Court. In Darces v. Woods12
the California Supreme Court looked to the "independent vitality"
of the state constitution' 3 in a ruling that had the practical effect
of extending benefits from the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children program (AFDC) to certain undocumented children., 4 The
Darces family consisted of an undocumented alien mother and her
six children, the older three of whom were not lawfully admitted to
the United States, while the younger three were American citizens by
birth.' The court found that the failure of the California Department
of Social Services to include the needs of the undocumented children
in assessing the family budget for AFDC purposes had the practical
effect of denying equal protection to the citizen children.'" The court
reached this conclusion by noting that, in reality, the aid payments
would support the entire family and not just the "eligible" citizen
children.' 7 Thus, the Court reasoned that the exclusion of the un-
documented children from eligibility for assistance deprived the eligible
children of the total aid to which they were entitled.
Although the Darces court was more concerned with the rights of
the citizen children, the effect of the ruling was to extend AFDC
benefits to the sibling undocumented alien children. " Under the Darces
rule, therefore, the parents in an undocumented family can render
all of their children eligible for benefits simply by having one child
born in the United States. The result of this case can be seen by com-
paring two hypothetical families. A family composed of six undocu-
mented children and one citizen child would receive full benefits while
a family of seven undocumented children would be denied benefits
entirely."' Although Darces extended benefits to certain undocumented
alien children, the decision created an inequity toward families com-
10. Id. at 223-24.
11. Id. at 220.
12. 35 Cal. 3d 871, 679 P.2d 458, 201 Cal. Rptr. 807 (1984).
13. Id. at 892, 679 P.2d at 472, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 821 (citing Serrano v. Preist, 18 Cal.
3d 728, 764, 557 P.2d 929, 950, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 366 (1976)).
14. See infra notes 114-20 and accompanying text.
15. Darces v. Woods, 35 Cal. 3d 871, 874-75, 679 P.2d 458, 460, 201 Cal. Rptr. 807,
809 (1984).
16. Id. at 895, 679 P.2d at 474, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 823.
17. Id. at 894, 679 P.2d at 473, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
18. Id. at 895, 679 P.2d at 474, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 823.
19. See infra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
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posed entirely of undocumented aliens. The inequity created by this
decision poses the question of the rights of illegal alien children to
receive public assistance.
Undocumented alien children constitute a group entitled to equal
protection by the California Constitution. 2 The sole basis for excluding
undocumented alien children from eligibility for AFDC benefits is
their undocumented status.2' This status, however, is unrelated to the
purposes of AFDC, which is to provide assistance to needy children.22
The result of this classification is to penalize undocumented alien
children for the illegal entry of their parents into the country. Although
this conduct by the parents may provide an adequate basis for ex-
cluding undocumented parents from eligibility, the argument should
not apply to children, who can do nothing to affect the legality of
their status. Furthermore, the legitimacy of this classification of
undocumented alien children may be subject to heightened judicial
scrutiny because the classification involves deprivation of an important
benefit. The constitutionality of excluding undocumented alien children
from AFDC eligibility is questionable both because of the innocence
and vulnerability of children as a class and because of the importance
of the benefit they are denied.23
This author proposes that withholding state aid from undocumented
alien children deprives them of equal protection under the California
Constitution.2" To reach this conclusion this author will discuss the
evolution of the federal25 and state26 equal protection clauses. Pivotal
in this development is the United States Supreme Court decision in
Plyler v. Doe.27 The Plyler decision is important primarily because the
Court used an intermediate standard of scrutiny to review the denial
of free public education to undocumented children.28 In addition, the
special status of children as a protected class will be considered.29
This author then will show that although the California Supreme Court
has not directly confronted the issue of the rights of undocumented
children,3" recent decisions by that court indicate a trend toward liberal
20. See infra notes 153-66 and accompanying text.
21. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §11104 (excluding undocumented aliens from eligibility for
AFDC).
22. Darces, 35 Cal. 3d at 888, 679 P.2d at 469, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
23. See infra notes 173-76 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 146-88 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 55-99 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 102-11 and accompanying text.
27. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
28. See infra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
30. See Darces, 35 Cal. 3d at 876, 679 P.2d at 461, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 810.
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construction of statutes to extend rights to the undocumented. 3' This
author will show that, because the state equal protection clause has
been interpreted by the California Supreme Court to be more expan-
sive than the federal equal protection clause,32 a basis for extension
of rights to undocumented children exists in California. 3 Having made
these arguments, this author will demonstrate that the California
Supreme Court should extend the Plyer rationale to find that equal
protection and fairness dictate that undocumented children are entitled
to AFDC benefits. Initially, however, the nature and extent of the
problem must be explored.
EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM
The "unlawful" status of undocumented immigrants keeps them
out of the mainstream of society, making research on their population
and impact on society difficult.3" Estimates of the number of undocu-
mented persons living in the United States have ranged from three
and a half million to ten million." As a border state, California has
become home to a large percentage of these illegal entrants.3 6 There-
fore, California bears a major share of the direct and indirect costs
resulting from the presence of undocumented persons.3 7 The existing
empirical data, however, indicate that undocumented persons contribute
more in taxes and social security payments than they cost in social
programs."
Related to the difficulties in determining the extent of the problem
31. See, e.g. id., Dermegerdich, 151 Cal. App. 3d at 851, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 32.
32. See infra notes 102-10 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 146-88 and accompanying text.
34. See generally SELECTED READINGS ON U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND LAW, SENATE
JUtiCIR.Y CoMMIrTEE, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 6-10 (1980) [hereinafter referred to as JUDICIAIR
COMMI TEE READINGS]; U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST, JOINT COMMIT-
TEE REPORT, JUDICIARY ComiTarrEE OF THE HOUSE AND SENATE, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., at 35-85
(1981) (all reporting the difficulty of research).
35. Immigration: Closing the Door, NEWSWEEK, June 15, 1984, at 19. See generally id.
(discussing current issues relating to undocumented aliens).
36. See LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, REG. SEss. 1977-78 UNDOCUMENTED
PERSONS: THEIR IMPACT ON PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, PUBLIC HEARING OF THE COMMrIrTEE
ON HumAN RESOURCES, (1977) (inquiry into impact of undocumented aliens on California, and
appropriate policy).
37. Increased costs result, for example, from increased burdens on police and the increased
use of public facilities. Id.
38. See 123 CONG. REC. H7061-67, July 13, 1977 (testimony of Wayne A. Cornelius, Pro-
fessor at Massachusets Institute of Technology, text of study entitled "Illegal Mexican Migration
to the United States: Recent Research Findings and Policy Implications.") (quoted in JUDICIARY
CoTrrTEE READINGS, supra note 34, at 65). See generally Fogel, Illegal Aliens: Economic Aspects
and Public Policy Alternatives, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 63, 63-78 (1977) (discussing impact of
undocumented aliens on social programs, labor markets and governmental policy).
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of undocumerited persons in the United States has been the inability
of both the state and federal governments to formulate a consistent
policy toward this group." The United States Constitution vests exclu-
sive authority to regulate immigration and naturalization with
Congress."0 Although standards are set for lawful immigration, the
number of illegal entrants to this country indicates that enforcement
of immigration laws is inadequate. Some critics have suggested that
the failure to enforce vigorously immigration laws is the manifestation
of an unarticulated acquiescence by the federal government to an eco-
nomic system that benefits from the inexpensive labor of undocumented
workers.' The Attorney General of the United States has explained
that immigration laws are not enforced because the federal govern-
ment has neither the resources, the capability, nor the motivation to
uproot millions who have become "members of the community. ' 42
Under the supremacy clause, ' 3 the states have no role in the regula-
tion of immigration.14 The states are left, however, to deal with the
swelling populations of foreign nationals within their borders. 5
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: RIGHTS OF AIENS
While all classes of aliens, including the legally resident and the
undocumented, have been accorded certain basic human rights, exten-
sion of constitutional guarantees to aliens has been a slow process. 4
Statutes have been passed, for example, giving resident aliens the right
to own property 7 and to sue in the Court of Claims." In addition,
the fifth amendment 49 has been read to protect all aliens "within the
jurisdiction" from deprivation of life, liberty, or property without
39. See generally JuDicARY CoMITTEE READINGS, supra note 34 at 21-77 (discussing im-
pact of undocumented aliens).
40. U.S. CONsT. art. I, §8, cl. 4; see also The Tarnished Golden Door, U.S. COlBUSSION
ON Civi RiGiTs, Sept. 1980, 13-45 (discussing current immigration policy and the role of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service).
41. Hull, Undocumented Aliens and the Equal Protection Clause: An Analysis of Doe
v. Plyler, 48 BROOKLYN L. Rav. 43, 64-65 (1981); see Plyler, 457 U.S. at 218-19.
42. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 218 n.17.
43. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
44. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, §8, cl. 4 (vesting immigration and naturalization power in
Congress).
45. The clear national power over immigration and naturalization raises the possibility of
federal preemption of all policy related to undocumented persons. See id. See generally J. CHOPER,
Y. Kmnsa, & L. TRIE, TmE StPRm COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 1981-82, National
Practice Institute 29-30 (1983) (discussing federal preemption of immigration law).
46. See generally Rosberg, Discrimination Against the "Nonresident" Alien, 44 U. PITT.
L. REv. 399, 399 (1983) (discussing development of rights for undocumented aliens).
47. 48 U.S.C. §1502.
48. 28 U.S.C. §2502.
49. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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due process of law.5" Despite the extension of these rights, the law
is clear that aliens, whether legally present or undocumented, are not
entitled to enjoy all the advantages of citizenship. Among the rights
withheld from aliens is the right to vote"' and the right to bear arms. 2
In addition, the United States Supreme Court has upheld exclusion
of aliens from various occupations deemed to involve participation
in "basic governmental processes." '5 3 The Court has found, however,
that certain classifications of aliens are violative of the protections
of the fourteenth amendment."
A. Equal Protection
In recent years, one of the strongest constitutional protections for
both citizens and aliens has been the fourteenth amendment of the
Constitution. 5 This amendment states that "no State shall . .. deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 56
This deceptively simple language frequently has been invoked to protect
the rights of threatened groups from the "tyranny of the majority." ' 5
Despite liberal application of the fourteenth amendment by the Court,
the equal protection clause has not been interpreted to prohibit all
discrimination, but rather to prevent only unreasonable discrimina-
tion.5" Persons challenging a statutory classification as unconstitutional
first must demonstrate that they are in an equivalent legal position
to those who benefit from the law. In other words, they must show
that they are similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purposes
of the law.59 To determine whether persons are similarly situated, an
inquiry into the purported governmental purpose of the law is
necessary. 6 The classification then is tested to determine if the
50. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976).
51. 42 U.S.C. §1971(a) (right to vote limited to citizens). But cf. U.S. CONST. amend.
XV (guarantees right to vote to citizens).
52. 18 U.S.C. §1202 (illegal aliens cannot possess firearms).
53. Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 439 (1982). The Court reasoned that certain
occupations require the "bond of citizenship." Id. at 442.
54. See infra notes 82-101.
55. See generally Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065,
1067-1192 (1969) (discussing development of the equal protection clause).
56. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, §1.
57. See J. NowAc, R. ROTUNPA, & J. YouNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 585 (2d ed. 1983).
58. See J. CHOPER, Y. KAmIsAR & L. TRmE, supra note 45, at I ("Equal Protection:
A Doctrinal Overview"); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949)
(Jackson, J., concurring) ("Federal Government must exercise their powers so as not to
discriminate between their inhabitants except upon some reasonable differentiation fairly related
to the object of regulation.").
59. Tussman & TenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAMF. L. REV. 341, 346
(1949).
60. See id. at 367.
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discrimination is tailored appropriately to further that purpose.6'
Certain classifications may be appropriate for one legislative purpose
but not for another. A classification based on gender, for example,
may be appropriate to further certain governmental purposes. Thus,
affirmative action hiring quotas designed to remedy past discrimination
against women probably would be upheld.62 A gender classification
will be inappropriate, however, in a statute demarcating the drinking
age between men and women. 63 On the other hand, a child will not
prevail in a challenge to the drinking age becd.use the child is not
similarly situated to those who are deemed mature enough to drink.
61
In that situation, the state purpose of limiting consumption of alcohol
to mature persons is served by the classification. The basis of any
classification must be related to the purpose of the law, which in
turn must be legitimate. Thus, the equal protection clause does not
bar all discrimination. Rather, the clause prohibits only unreasonable
discrimination, which results from those classifications found not to
be acceptably related to furthering the purpose of a law.6"
B. Standard of Review
In assessing the constitutionality of a law containing a classification,
courts have applied varying levels of scrutiny depending upon the
nature of the governmental classification. Judicial review is limited
to determining whether the classification is tailored appropriately to
fulfill an acceptable governmental purpose.66 The traditional test,
applied to most legislation, requires only that the classification be
"rationally related" to a "legitimate state interest." ' 67 Under this ra-
tional relation test laws are presumed valid and most laws survive
61review.
In stark contrast to the rational relation test is the strict scrutiny
standard, which will validate classifications only if they are "necessari-
ly" related to a "compelling state interest."' 6 The strict scrutiny test
is very difficult to satisfy and few laws subjected to review under
61. See J. NowAic, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 57, at 586-600.
62. See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320 (1977).
63. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 213-14 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring). In Craig, the Court
struck down a law establishing different drinking ages for men and women.
64. See generally J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 57, at 586-600 (discuss-
ing the "similarly situated" requirement).
65. See J. CHOPER, Y. KYAgivsA & L. TRIE, supra note 45, at 1-2.
66. Id.
67. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971).
68. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAav. L. Rev. 1065, 1078 (1982).
69. Graham, 403 U.S. at 372.
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this standard will prevail." The Supreme Court has found strict
scrutiny to be warranted only in ruling on classifications involving
"suspect classes ' 7' or statutes that impinge upon exercise of "funda-
mental rights." ' 72 In general, suspect classes have been limited to racial
or ethnic minorities, 73 and fundamental rights are considered to be
only those rights guaranteed by the Constitution.7"
In the last decade a hybrid standard of review, known as intermedi-
ate scrutiny, has emerged. This quasi-strict standard requires a
classification to be "substantially related" to an "important state
interest." ' 75 The intermediate standard first emerged as a check against
gender based discrimination7 6 and discrimination against illegitimate
children. 77 More recently, this new standard recently has been employed
to scrutinize a classification of undocumented alien children." This
development is important because undocumented aliens historically
have received little constitutional protection. 79
C. Application of Equal Protection to Aliens
Constitutional protection for noncitizens initially was extended only
to legally resident aliens.8" The fourteenth amendment long has pro-
vided resident aliens with protection against discriminatory classifica-
70. J. CHOPER, Y. KAmisAR & L. TR.BE, supra note 45, at 2; see Hull, Resident Aliens
and the Equal Protection Clause: The Burger Court's Retreat from Graham v. Richardson,
47 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1, 18 (1980) (discussing retreat by the Supreme Court from broad ap-
plication of strict scrutiny for classifications based on alienage).
71. See Graham, 403 U.S. at 372 (finding aliens to be a suspect class); Brown v. Board
of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (applying strict scrutiny to invalidate racial classifica-
tions in schools).
72. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1976) (right of a family
to live together found fundamental); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 380-81 (1977) (right
to marry found fundamental); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969) (right to travel
interstate found fundamental).
73. E.g., Graham, 403 U.S. at 372 (finding aliens to be a prime example of a discrete
and insular minority, and therefore applying strict scrutiny to an Arizona law depriving most
aliens of welfare).
74. E.g., San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33
(1973) (finding that education is not a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution).
75. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 197 (applying intermediate standard to invalidate state
law prohibiting the sale of 3.2% alcohol beer to males under twenty-one and females under
eighteen); see J. CHOPER, Y. KAmisAR & L. TRmE, supra note 45, at 3 (discussing recognition
of an intermediate level of scrutiny).
76. J. CHOPER, Y. KAmiSAR & L. TalBE, supra note 45, at 3-4.
77. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 268 (1978) (applying intermediate standard to state law
excluding illegitimate children from inheriting through intestate succession).
78. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216-18.
79. See generally G. Rosberg, Discrimination Against the "Nonresident" Alien, 44 U. Prrr.
L. Rav. 399, 399-409 (1983) (discussing rights accorded undocumented aliens).
80. See J. NowA, R. ROTUNDA & J. YouNG, supra note 57, at 698.
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tions in state law. 81 In Graham v. Richardson82 the United States
Supreme Court held that resident aliens were a perfect example of
a "discrete and insular minority" entitled to strict scrutiny under the
equal protection clause.83 To a certain extent, the Court has retreated
from this position, applying a rational basis test if the discrimination
involves participation in "basic governmental processes." 4 These deci-
sions regarding constitutional protections of aliens, however, do not
apply directly to determination of appropriate protections for undocu-
mented aliens. 5
D. Plyler v. Doe: Equal Protection for Undocumented Alien
Children
In the watershed case of Plyler v. Doe,86 the United States Supreme
Court broke new ground by considering the rights of undocumented
aliens under the equal protection clause. In a close decision, 7 the
Court applied an intermediate standard of scrutiny and determined
that a Texas law denying free public education to undocumented alien
children did not serve a "substantial state interest" and unconstitu-
tionally deprived the children of equal protection of the laws." The
analysis of the Court began with the language of the fourteenth amend-
ment and found that undocumented aliens were "within the jurisdic-
tion" of the state of Texas. 9 The Court, however, did not find
undocumented aliens to be a suspect class under equal protection
81. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886) (strict scrutiny applied
to invalidate law that effectively prohibited Chinese-run laundries in San Francisco); cf. Toll
v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 17 (1982) (court invalidated state law discriminating against aliens on
supremacy clause grounds). Contra Mathews, 426 U.S. at 83-84 (1976) (because Congress has
plenary power over immigration, classifications may exist under federal law that are imper-
missable under state law).
82. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
83. Id. at 372.
84. Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. at 439. Controversy continues over what constitutes
participation in "basic governmental processes." See id. at 438-41. This standard has been
applied, for example, to exclude aliens from being probation officers. Id. at 447. Aliens have
also been excluded from being members of a police force. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291,
300 (1978). The Court has also upheld a law disallowing aliens from being teachers in public
schools. Ambach v. Norwich, 441 U.S. 68, 80-81 (1979).
85. See generally Comment, Equal Protection for Undocumented Aliens, 5 CmcAo L.
REv. 29, 48-54 (1982) (proposes application of equal protection to all aliens).
86. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). See generally Casenote, Right of Illegal-Alien Children to State
Provided Education, 96 HARv. L. REv. 130, 130-40 (1982) (describing the Plyler decision); J.
CHOPER, Y. KAWISAR & L. TRIE, supra note 45, at 21-32.
87. The majority opinion was written by Justice Brennan, 457 U.S. at 205, with separate
concurring opinions by Justices Marshall, id. at 230, Blackmun, id. at 231, and Powell, id.
at 236. Three justices joined the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Burger. Id. at 242.
88. Id. at 223-30.
89. Id. at 212.
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standards.90 Moreover, the Court did not find education to be a funda-
mental right owed to all persons. 9' Thus, strict scrutiny could not
be employed. Nonetheless, the court applied an intermediate standard
of scrutiny, reasoning that while undocumented children were not a
suspect class, their special status in society entitled them to increased
protection under the Constitution. 92 In addition, the Court found that
although education is not a fundamental right, the deprivation of
education was serious enough to warrant heightened, or intermediate,
scrutiny.93
The dual bases of the Plyler decision were the special status of
undocumented alien children and the importance of education to these
children. The Court analogized to the plight of illegitimate children
who, like undocumented children, were not responsible for their disabl-
ing status.94 The Court found that denial of education to undocu-
mented children was unfair because this denial directed the "onus
of the parent's misconduct" at the children. 9 Furthermore, the Court
found discrimination against undocumented children an ineffective
means of deterring the unlawful entry of their parents into the United
States.96 Though the Court did not find education to be a fundamental
right, the Plyler Court looked to the critical role education plays in
the development of a child, noting that deprivation of education would
impose a lifetime hardship upon these children.9 1 Balancing these fac-
tors, the Court concluded that Texas had not demonstrated any
substantial state interest that would justify denial of education to un-
documented children. 9 In particular, the Court pointed out that while
a state may have an interest in controlling spending, this economiz-
ing could not be accomplished through arbitrary and discriminatory
classifications. 99
As this author has outlined, the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment has been employed to invalidate a wide variety
of laws. In an equal protection challenge, a court must determine
if a state law creates classifications that discriminate against classes
90. Id. at 219 n.19.
91. Id. at 223.
92. Id. at 221.
93. Id. at 238.
94. Id. at 219-20.
95. Id. at 220.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 223.
98. Id. at 230. The Court noted that "It is difficult to understand precisely what the state
hopes to achieve by promoting the creation and perpetuation of a subclass of illiterates within
our boundaries, surely adding to problems and costs of unemployment, welfare and crime." Id.
99. Id. at 228-29.
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of persons without adequate justification. In most instances, classifica-
tions will be upheld as rationally related to a legitimate state end.
Few state laws, however, withstand the strict scrutiny test required
for classifications based upon race or ethnicity or that involve depriva-
tions of fundamental rights. Under strict scrutiny, a state must
demonstrate that the allegedly discriminatory classification necessarily
is related to a compelling state interest.' Requiring a lesser degree
of justification than the strict scrutiny test is the emerging intermediate
standard of review. The intermediate standard recently was applied
to prohibit a classification of undocumented children that resulted
in a denial of free public education.'0 ' The federal approach to equal
protection provides a guideline for interpretation of similar clauses
in state constitutions.
CALIFORNIA LAW: EQUAL PROTECTION AND ALIENS
In addition to the guarantees of the fourteenth amendment, equal
protection is provided for in the California Constitution.0 2 While inter-
pretation of the fourteenth amendment provides guidelines for state
equal protection, the California Supreme Court has held that the equal
protection clause of the state constitution provides "separate and
distinct" safeguards.' 0 3 California has adopted the rational basis test
for most legislation and strict scrutiny if distinctions involve suspect
classes or fundamental rights."' California courts, however, consistently
have declined to adopt the intermediate standard of review,1°5 opting
for strict scrutiny in close cases.'0 6 The California Supreme Court,
for example, has found gender based classifications to be suspect and
subject to strict scrutiny. 7 In addition, the California Supreme Court
has been more liberal than the United States Supreme Court in defining
the fundamental rights protected by the constitution. Education, for
example, has been included by the California Supreme Court in the
enumeration of fundamental rights entitled to constitutional
protection.'0 8 Thus, the "independent vitality" of the state constitu-
100. J. NoWvAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, supra note 57, at 591.
101. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230.
102. CAL. CONST. art. I, §7(a).
103. See, e.g., Price v. Civil Service Comm'n of Sacramento County, 26 Cal. 3d 257, 284,
604 P.2d 1365, 1382, 161 Cal. Rptr. 475, 492 (1980).
104. See, e.g., Molar v. Gates, 98 Cal. App. 3d 1, 12-13, 159 Cal. Rptr. 239, 246 (1979).
105. Hawkins v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 584, 607, 586 P.2d 916, 932, 150 Cal. Rptr.
435, 451 (1978) (Bird, C.J., concurring).
106. Molar, 98 Cal. App. 3d at 16-17, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 249.
107. Id.
108. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 610, 487 P.2d 1241, 1259, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 619
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Serrano 1].
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tion occasionally has been interpreted to demand an analysis different
from that required by the federal standard.' 9
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution estab-
lishes minimum standards for state equal protection guarantees."10 The
states are free, however, to grant additional rights and benefits beyond
those accorded aliens at the national level.I" Recent decisions indicate
that the California Supreme Court may be willing to extend equal
protection to ensure rights for the undocumented.
A. Darces v. Woods
In Darces v. Woods'" the California Supreme Court relied upon
both the analysis of the United States Supreme Court in Plyler and
upon the equal protection language of the state constitution in a deci-
sion that effectively extended certain public benefits to undocumented
alien children.' The facts of this case, however, did not require the
court to directly address the issue of the rights of the undocumented
children. This author contends that undocumented children are entitled
to equal protection under the California Constitution and hence are
entitled to certain public benefits.
The issue in Darces was whether undocumented children were to
be included in the family budget for AFDC purposes."" Mrs. Darces
was an undocumented alien and working mother with income insuffi-
cient to meet the needs of her six children. The older three children
also were undocumented and therefore ineligible for assistance under
the AFDC program. The younger three children, however, were United
States citizens, and thus eligible for AFDC benefits. Mrs. Darces
challenged a ruling by the California Department of Social Services
that entitled the family to assistance based only on the needs of the
three citizen children. She asserted that since her duty as a mother
requires her to provide for all six children, the practical effect of
this policy was to deny the eligible children the full AFDC benefits
to which they were entitled." ' The court accepted Mrs. Darces' argu-
109. Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 764, 557 P.2d 929, 950, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 366
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Serrano 11].
110. See Purdy v. Fitzpatrick, 71 Cal. 2d 566, 578, 456 P.2d 645, 657, 79 Cal. Rpir. 77,
89 (1969).
111. Serrano IH, 18 Cal. 3d at 764, 557 P.2d at 950, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 366 (1976).
112. 35 Cal. 3d 871, 679 P.2d 458, 201 Cal. Rptr. 807 (1984).
113. See generally California-Constitutional Equal Protection for AFDC Beneficiaries, 61
AME ICAN CoUNcn, FOR NAToN rr ms SERVICE No. 35, at 728-32 (Sept. 7, 1984) (report of
the Darces decision).
114. Darces, 35 Cal. 3d at 874-75, 679 P.2d at 460, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 809.
115. Id.
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ment and concluded that the AFDC regulations unfairly discriminated
against citizen children who lived with undocumented siblings.1" 6 The
Darces court considered the needs of Mrs. Darces' undocumented
children for AFDC purposes without directly considering the rights
of these children." 7 The decision, however, did lay the groundwork
for extension of rights to undocumented children.
In the Darces decision, the court first determined that the state
AFIC program complied with federal regulations for eligibility that
excluded consideration of the needs of undocumented children.,18
Under AFDC rules, the needs of an alien only may be considered
if the alien is "lawfully admitted for permanent residence or is other-
wise permanently residing in the United States under color of law."1
9
The court concluded that this clear statutory scheme should be upheld
unless violative of the state or federal constitutional requirement of
equal protection.' 20
The guarantees of equal protection' were defined by the court
as requiring that persons similarly situated with respect to the legitimate
purposes of the law receive like treatment.' 22 Proceeding with an equal
protection analysis, the court next considered the appropriate standard
of review.' 23 In determining the nature of the classification, the court,
as the United States Supreme Court had in Plyler, analogized to the
plight of illegitimate children who were discriminated against solely
because of the unmarried status of their parents.'24 The citizen children
in Darces were seen in the same light because they had no control
over the existence of their undocumented siblings. By adopting this
classification, the state had drawn a line between AFDC-eligible
children who live with undocumented siblings and eligible children
who do not.' 21 The classification was found to discriminate between
two classes of children similarly situated with respect to the purposes
of AFDC, namely, providing aid to needy children.' 26 Thus, the needs
of undocumented children had to be taken into account by the Depart-
ment of Social Services in determining the needs of the citizen children.
116. Id. at 895, 679 P.2d at 474, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 823.
117. Id. at 876, 679 P.2d at 461, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 810.
118. Id. at 883, 679 P.2d at 466, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 815.
119. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §11104; see also 45 C.F.R. §233.50; 42 U.S.C. §602(a)(33)
(containing parallel federal provisions).
120. Darces, 35 Cal. 3d at 885, 679 P.2d at 467, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 816.
121. See U.S. CON T. amend. XIV, §1; CAL. CONST. art. I, §7(a).
122. Darces, 35 Cal. 3d at 885, 679 P.2d at 467, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 816.
123. Id.
124. Darces, 35 Cal. 3d at 887-88, 679 P.2d at 468-69, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 817-18; Plyler,
457 U.S. at 220.
125. Darces, 35 Cal. 3d at 887, 679 P.2d at 468, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 817.
126. Id. at 888, 679 P.2d at 469, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
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The court found that the discriminatory classification of undocu-
mented alien children by the AFDC program warranted heightened
judicial scrutiny.'27 Although the court acknowledged that the ques-
tioned classifications were different than those in Plyler, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court looked to the reasoning of the United States
Supreme Court in that case. 28 The Darces court, like the Plyler Court,
placed emphasis upon the special status of children, that entitled them
to increased legal protection.' 29 Among the factors relied upon by
the court was the children's lack of culpability for their status;"' they
could not control their parents' illegal entry into the country."'
The Department of Social Services argued that the heightened
scrutiny of Ply/er was not warranted in Darces. The Department at-
tempted to distinguish the two cases by asserting that the Plyler decision
was based upon deprivation of education, not welfare. Thus, the
Department of Social Services argued, heightened scrutiny was only
applicable to classifications that deprived education. The Darces court
noted, however, that the Plyer result was not dependent on
characterization of education as a fundamental right. 3 2 To support
the use of heightened scrutiny of discriminatory classifications in the
welfare context, the court cited Justice Powell's concurrence in Plyler,
in which he stated, "If the resident children of illegal aliens were
denied welfare assistance, made available by government to all other
children who qualify, this also-in my opinion-would be an impermis-
sible penalizing of children because their parents' status," (emphasis
added by the Darces court).133 These considerations led the Darces court
to apply not an intermediate standard of reviewing as had been employed
in Plyler,3 but rather a strict standard of scrutiny. The court explained
that this higher level of scrutiny was justified in part by the "in-
dependent vitality" of the California equal protection clause. 3 '
Finally, the Darces court was unpersuaded by the arguments of the
state that the classification was necessary to further a compelling state
interest. 3 6 The court stated that the classification of undocumented
127. Id. at 893, 679 P.2d at 472, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 821.
128. Id. at 890-92, 679 P.2d at 471-72, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 820-21.
129. Id.
130. Id.




135. Id. The Darces majority noted that although their decision rested on the equal protec-
tion clause in the California Constitution, they believed the same result would have been reached
under fourteenth amendment review. Id. at 895 n.25, 679 P.2d at 474 n.25, 201 Cal. Rptr.
at 823 n.25.
136. Id. at 895, 679 P.2d at 474, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 823.
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children was "clearly irrelevant to the goals and objectives of the
AFDC program,""' since the objective of that program is to feed
needy children. The court was equally unimpressed by the assertion
of the state that budgetary concerns justified the exclusion of undocu-
mented aliens in determining a family's need for AFDC purposes.' 38
The court again cited Plyler for the proposition that "a concern for
preservation of resources standing alone can hardly justify the classifi-
cation.'" 3 Finally, the court rejected the argument by the state that
failure to exclude these children would be a violation of federal
regulations.4 0 The court noted that although AFDC is a joint federal-
state program, the responsibility for setting eligibility standards is left
to the states, within certain guidelines.' 4 ' In situations in which the
state has more liberal eligibility standards, the only limitation is that
the state must make the additional payments from the state treasury
without federal matching funds.' 42 In other words, the Department
of Social Services can extend aid to undocumented aliens, but must
do so with money solely from state funds.' 4 3 The Darces court,
therefore, allowed a limited extension of AFDC benefits to undocu-
mented alien children. Unlike Plyler, the decision did not rely upon
the equal protection of undocumented alien children, but looked to
the rights of citizen children. The reliance by the Darces court on
Plyler, however, indicates a recognition that undocumented alien
children are denied equal protection when they are excluded from
AFDC eligibility. 44
B. Beyond Darces
In Darces the California Supreme Court looked to the "independent
vitality" of the equal protection clause of the California Constitution
to invalidate the separate treatment of citizen children with undocu-
mented siblings under the AFDC program. 4 5 The court applied strict
scrutiny'46 to this classification and the state was unable to meet the
burden of showing that the classification was necessary to further a
compelling state interest.'47 This decision requires the needs of undocu-
137. Id. at 888, 679 P.2d at 469, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
138. Id. at 944, 679 P.2d at 473, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 894-95, 679 P.2d at 473-74, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 822-23.
141. Id. at 881 n.8, 679 P.2d at 464 n.8, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 813 n.8.
142. Id. at 895, 679 P.2d at 474, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 823.
143. Id.
144. See Id. at 890, 679 P.2d at 471, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
145. Id. at 895, 679 P.2d at 474, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 823.
146. Id. at 892, 679 P.2d at 472, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 821.
147. Id. at 895, 679 P.2d at 474, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 823.
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mented children with citizen siblings to be taken into account in deter-
mining the aid payments to a family.' 48 The mixed class of citizen
and undocumented alien children in this case allowed the court to
extend AFDC benefits to undocumented alien children without direct
consideration of the rights of the undocumented alien children. 49 The
Darces holding, however, creates an inequity between classes of undoc-
umented aliens. Those having citizen siblings will receive full AFDC
payments yet those without will not.
This author proposes that the exclusion of undocumented alien
children not living with citizen siblings from eligibility for AFDC
benefits deprives those children of equal protection under the California
Constitution. Although federal AFDC guidelines do not require consid-
eration of the needs of undocumented alien children,5 0 the California
Supreme Court has ruled that the needs of undocumented children
are to be considered when those children are residing with documented
siblings.15' While Darces extends benefits to undocumented children
with citizen siblings, the decision creates a new disparity toward undoc-
umented children who do not have citizen siblings. The Darces deci-
sion should be reassessed applying the rationale of the United States
Supreme Court in Plyler v. Doe to extend the protections of the equal
protection clause to undocumented alien children.
The Darces opinion can be the basis for extending the guarantees
of the equal protection clause of the California Constitution to undoc-
umented alien children. Although the Darces court was not confronted
with this issue,' 5 2 language in the opinion indicates a willingness by
the court to find that denial of AFDC benefits to undocumented
children who are not fortunate enough to have a documented sibling
is, in itself, unfair discrimination.' In addition, the practical inequity
created by the decision requires that Darces be reconsidered.
Although the reasoning of the California Supreme Court solved
the issue presented by the facts in the Darces case, the decision creates
serious inequities. The holding also leaves unresolved the issue of what
rights undocumented alien children are entitled to under the equal
protection clause of the state constitution. Practical application of
the Darces decision results in the situation that in order for an entire
family of undocumented persons to qualify for AFDC benefits, the
148. Id.
149. Id. at 876, 679 P.2d at 461, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 810.
150. Id. at 880, 679 P.2d at 463-64, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 812-13.
151. Id. at 895, 679 P.2d at 474, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 823.
152. Id. at 876, 679 P.2d at 461, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 810.
153. See, e.g., id. at 892-93, 679 P.2d at 472-73, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 821-22.
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parents simply need to have a child born in the United States. Aside
from encouraging undocumented women to have additional children,
this situation creates a serious disparity between benefits available for
classes of undocumented aliens. The unfairness is clear in a comparison
of two families with undocumented children. A family of six undocu-
mented children is not entitled to receive any benefits, but a family
of six undocumented children and one citizen child would be entitled
to benefits for all seven children. Since these families are similarly
situated in terms of the purpose of the AFDC program, which is to
provide aid to needy children, this classification should be subject
to greater .scrutiny under the equal protection clause of the state
constitution.
As noted, the equal protection clause, both in the state and federal
constitutions, has been an important check against discriminatory
classifications of minority groups."' The United States Supreme Court
has developed three standards of judicial review for allegedly discrimi-
natory classifications: rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, and strict
scrutiny. The California Supreme Court has adopted the rational basis
and strict scrutiny tests, but has declined to adopt the intermediate
standard, opting for strict scrutiny in borderline cases.' 55 The California
Supreme Court also has recognized certain fundamental rights and
suspect classes not currently recognized in federal law.' 56 The broad
protections of the California Constitution as well as the commitment
of the state supreme court to the independence of the state
constitution'57 leaves California poised for extension of the equal pro-
tection clause to undocumented alien children.
This author proposes that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard
of review for a classification that excludes undocumented aliens from
eligibility for AFDC benefits. The combined factors of the status of
children and the importance of the benefit involved requires that this
classification be subject to heightened judicial review. The Darces deci-
sion requires that AFDC benefits be extended to one group of undocu-
mented alien children, those with documented siblings.' While this
decision does extend the benefits available to the undocumented, the
holding also has created unfairness within that group. The resulting
classification should be deemed a violation of equal protection because
the classification violates the rights of undocumented children to receive
154. See supra notes 55-79 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
158. Darces, 35 Cal. 3d at 895, 679 P.2d at 474, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 823.
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AFDC benefits. An equal protection analysis will show that the special
status of children, as well as the importance of AFDC benefits to
those children, requires a heightened standard of review. Under strict
scrutiny, the state would be unable to justify the classification with
a compelling interest.
EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
Undocumented alien children are entitled to the constitutional protec-
tions accorded a suspect class. The primary reason for the extension
of rights in both Plyler and Darces is the special status of children.'5 9
Both the United States Supreme Court and the California Supreme
Court, in conferring a protected status on children, have acknowledged
the vulnerability of children and the need for public benefits essential
to their early growth and development. In Plyler, for instance, the
Court pointed out that depriving children of education early in life
increased the possibility that they would become burdens on society.' 0
The Court recognized that because the parents brought the children
across the border illegally, undocumented children were not responsible
for their disabling status.'"' Thus, although the illegality of an alien's
immigration status may be a valid reason for denying benefits to adults,
the argument does not apply to their undocumented children. The
vulnerability and innocence of the children combine to support char-
acterization of undocumented alien children as a suspect class entitled
to heightened protection."6 2
Integral to an equal protection challenge is a demonstration that
the class challenging the allegedly discriminatory statute is in a similar
legal position as the group benefiting from the classification. In other
words, the successful challenger must show that the discriminatory
classification does not further a purpose of the law, a purpose that
must, in turn, be legitimate.' 3 The avowed purpose of the AFDC
program is to provide assistance to needy children.' 4 Clearly, an
159. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 237 (Powell, J., concurring); Darces, 35 Cal. 3d at 892, 679
P.2d at 472, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 821; (the California Supreme Court analogizes from Plyler,
but chooses strict rather than intermediate scrutiny); cf. Plyler, 457 U.S. 202, 233 (although
the Court declines to apply strict scrutiny for the classification of undocumented aliens, the
Court does apply intermediate scrutiny).
160. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230.
161. Id. at 220.
162. Id.; Darces, 35 Cal. 3d at 892, 679 P.2d at 472, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 821. Protection
of children occurs in other areas of the law such as state prosecutions for child neglect. See,
e.g., CAL. PneAL CoDE §270.
163. See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
164. See Burnham v. Woods, 70 Cal. App. 3d 667, 673, 139 Cal. Rptr. 4, 7 (1977) (primary
purpose of AFDC is to feed needy children).
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undocumented child is no less in need of food, clothing, and health
care than a citizen child. 165 All children, documented or undocumented,
are similarly situated and should be entitled to receive welfare benefits.
Apart from designation of children as a suspect class, strict judicial
scrutiny will be invoked if the interest involved is deemed "funda-
mental." 1 6 6 In Darces, the court noted that the facts of the case did
not require consideration whether any fundamental rights were
implicated. 67 Although welfare has not been conferred the status of
a fundamental right,168 the judiciary clearly has recognized the great
importance of public assistance benefits. 69 California is free to elevate
welfare to the level of a fundamental right, deprivation of which would
require strict scrutiny under an equal protection analysis. 7 ' Short of
finding receipt of AFDC funds to be a fundamental right, the Darces
court recognized that full benefits to a family are important. 7 ' Clearly,
the receipt of funds to fulfill basic human needs is, like education,
critical to the development of a child.
In Plyler, a heightened level of scrutiny was fashioned because of
the combination of a quasi-suspect class and implication of an "im-
portant," though not fundamental, right.'72 Although the California
Supreme Court could justify the use of strict scrutiny solely on the
classification of undocumented alien children, the importance of the
right involved buttresses the use of strict scrutiny.'73 Like the classifica-
tion in Plyler, the AFDC classification of undocumented alien children
involves a total deprivation of an important benefit. 74 The depriva-
tion of assistance in meeting basic human needs, like the deprivation
of education, can cause lifelong damage.7 5 This argument, however,
loses force when applied to adult undocumented aliens, who are present
in the country voluntarily and presumably capable of providing for
their own needs.
A classification that is found to be discriminatory nonetheless will
be upheld if the state can demonstrate a substantial interest in the
165. Darces, 35 Cal. 3d at 888, 679 P.2d at 469, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
166. See supra notes 55-111, 146-88 and accompanying text.
167. Darces, 35 Cal. 3d at 893 n.24, 679 P.2d at 473 n.24, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 822 n.24.
168. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
169. See id.; Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 627.
170. See generally, Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH.
U.L.Q. 659, 659-87 (arguing for recognition of welfare as a fundamental right).
171. See Darces, 35 Cal. 3d at 895, 679 P.2d at 474, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 823.
172. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221-22.
173. See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
174. Undocumented aliens are ineligible for AFDC benefits. CAL. WELt. & INsT. CODE §11104.
175. See Darces, 35 Cal. 3d 891, 679 P.2d at 471, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
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classification.' 76 The primary justification generally offered by a state
in support of classifications that disallow welfare payments to undocu-
mented aliens is the interest in saving money. The courts, however,
have not been entirely sympathetic to the fiscal concerns of states.'"
In Plyler, the Court stated that budgetary concerns were insufficient
and that a state must "do more than justify its classification with
a concise expression of an intention to discriminate." 178
A related contention in Darces was that federal guidelines preclude
consideration of the needs of undocumented children.'79 The court
rejected this argument, noting that no legal barrier exists to an exten-
sion of benefits from state funds.'80 The federal AFDC statute estab-
lishes a minimum standard for benefits. The state is free, however,
to allocate benefits in excess of federal requirements.' 8 ' While Darces
accomplishes a limited extension of benefits, this author argues that
further extension is required to ensure benefits for all undocumented
children.
An additional justification advanced for discriminating against
undocumented persons is that most are in this country illegally. This
"outlaw theory" holds that illegal immigrants have no right to benefit
from their unlawful status."8 2 This contention was rejected by the Plyler
Court, which conceded that while there may be validity in denying
benefits to undocumented adults, the argument is not persuasive when
applied to the denial of benefits to children.'83 The Court pointed
out that children have no control over their illegal entry into this
country. Further, their parents are not likely to be deterred from entry
by the unavailability of benefits to their children.' 4 The Plyler Court
was not persuaded by the deterrence argument, stating that "it is
. . . difficult to conceive of a rational justification for penalizing
[undocumented alien children] for their presence in the United
States."'8 5 Since the children are the primary beneficiaries of the aid,
withholding whatever indirect benefit flows to the parents from the
176. Id.
177. Id. at 884, 679 P.2d at 473, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
178. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 227.
179. Darces, 35 Cal. 3d at 894, 679 P.2d at 473, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
180. Id. at 894-95, 679 P.2d at 473-74, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 822-23.
181. Id.
182. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 250 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 219-20.
184. See id. at 228. Research has shown that undocumented adults do not immigrate in
order to take advantage of public assistance programs; rather, they enter this country in search
of employment. See PUBLIc HA mG, supra note 2, at 41.
185. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220.
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assistance is an insufficient reason for withholding aid through the
discriminatory classification.'
8 6
To survive a challenge to AFDC eligibility rules the state must
demonstrate a compelling reason for a classification that denies benefits
to certain children. Although the state may have a legitimate interest
in restraining spending or deterring illegal immigration, a court is
unlikely to accept this interest as sufficient to justify discriminatory
classifications.' 87 Thus, a classification that denies AFDC benefits to
undocumented alien children would not survive strict scrutiny under
the equal protection clause and would be unconstitutional
discrimination.
CONCLUSION
This author has established that the equal protection clause of the
California Constitution requires that undocumented alien children be
eligible for assistance under the state AFDC program. The historical
development of the equal protection clause at both state and federal
levels indicates that undocumented children are a prime example of
a group deserving protection. In Plyler v. Doe the United States
Supreme Court took the first step in extending the fourteenth amend-
ment to undocumented children by ruling that denial of free public,
education constituted a deprivation of equal protection. The California
Supreme Court employed this reasoning in the Darces decision, ex-
tending AFDC benefits to undocumented children in limited circum-
stances. The Darces decision, however, did not result from considera-
tion of the rights of undocumented alien children, but rather, from
the equal protection claims of their citizen siblings. Thus, the California
court has not yet faced directly the issue of the rights of undocumented
children. California should rely upon the independence of the state
constitution to extend benefits to undocumented children on the basis
of their status as a protected class and through continued acknowledg-
ment of the importance of welfare benefits.
Jennifer Merritt Wilcoxen
186. See Ruiz v. Blum, 549 F. Supp. 871, 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
187. See generally Comment, Undocumented Aliens' Right to Medicaid after Plyler v. Doe,
7 FoRDHAni INT'L L. REv. 83, 83-117 (1984) (supporting extension of Medicaid to undocumented
aliens).
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